Monday’s Mtg (4/10/23): What are Americans’ worst misconceptions about the rest of the world, and vice versa?
It is a holiday weekend, not a homework weekend. For this topic on mutual misunderstandings between Americans and the rest of the world, let’s hope we can generate a lot of our discussion from group members’ direct experience. We have immigrant members from many countries, people that have lived abroad, and a range of ages. The latter is important because I do not want to get bogged down in 30–40-year-old stereotypes that newer generations have left behind. (It is true that national/religious stereotypes often last for generations, but this is a well-rounded group so hopefully we have left in the past “all Americans are rich/arrogant” and “poor countries are hellholes,” “Arabs are violent” and other hackneyed beliefs.)
The vague wording hurts us, but not fatally, IMO. Yes, there are 330 million Americans (225m adults), and asking what “we” believe about the rest of the world requires a lot of aggregating and generalizing. The same is true the other way around. The “rest of the world” is 200+ countries; thousands of cultures, ethnic groups, languages, etc.; a half dozen major religious faiths and hundreds of smaller ones; just to touch on the vast diversity of 7 billion non-Americans. What do “we” and “they” think about each other, even at one snapshot moment in time, is not really a question with an answer.
Moreover, Americans themselves are sharply divided on core facts and beliefs about our own country, as we talked about last week. Our country is in an internal Cold War over our history, culture, race, science, immigration’s value, the proper roles for govt/biz, and even the basic meaning of democracy and the Constitution. As we discussed, regional sterotypes persist here.
What do “we” think about Islam and Mexico?? Many Americans are too saturated in myths and propaganda to know ourselves, much less others.
Still, two very important reason led me to suggest this topic.
- Americans must be able to see ourselves as others see us – whether they are right or wrong about us. Historically we do not do that very well, and catastrophes (for us and other countries) have followed. If U.S. influence really is ebbing, seeing ourselves through 7 billion new sets of eyes will come to matter more and more.
- There is always value in saying out loud our stereotypes and generalizations about others. It helps us examine assumptions, facts, values, prejudices, etc.
Have a happy Easter weekend and I will see you on Monday. Also, don’t forget to sign up for our spring party on April 30th at Nick’s house.
OPTIONAL BACKGROUND READINGS –
About us –
- 2021 Pew report: “What People Around the World Like and Dislike About American Society and Politics.” Long but recommended, at least the highlights.
- Global map of U.S. favorability by country. (2020, so Trump soured our image.) Easy overview.
- Ally or threat? To some countries we are one or other; some both.
- From a travel site: Many foreigners get false their beliefs about USA from movies, TV, other entertainment media.
By us –
- We did talk about Americans’ ignorance of other countries and cultures, in 2019.
- Video 34m – Why Americans misunderstand the world. Former CIA agent wrote book of same name. Focus on how our ignorance/naiveté about world warp U.S. foreign policy. Recommended if time.
- 27 myths the West has about developing countries. From a non-U.S., pro-foreign aid group.
- Fun comments from a Reddit thread on this subject.
- Muslims: U.S. public opinion has moderated lately. But half of U.S. adults still think Muslims are not part of mainstream U.S. society. Which Amis drive these views? Guess.
NEXT WEEK (4/17/23): How will major world religions evolve in 21st century?
Monday’s Mtg Part II: Nile’s paper on U.S. foreign aid to Egypt (excerpt)
Notes: See next post down for the usual pre-mtg background from DavidG. I removed the footnotes from Nile’s paper to make it easier to read. Sorry for the late notice.
Nile Regina El Wardani, MPH, MPhil, PhD
Short Excerpt
The Historical Role of Donors and the Price of Aid:
A Case Study of Agriculture & AID in Egypt
Over the past five decades, Egypt has been a major recipient of foreign aid from many
sources including the U.S., Western Europe, Japan and international financial organisations
such as the Islamic Development Bank (IDB), the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (IBRD), the Soviet Union, Eastern European countries, China and many Arab
states. Largely because of the geo-political importance of Egypt to the West, and in line with
the Camp David Accord, Egypt remains the second largest recipient of USAID funds after
Israel.
US policy leverage, over the past three decades, has greatly influenced macroeconomic policy
in Egypt. Egypt’s path to a market-oriented economy following 40 years of heavy state
intervention in resource allocation has yielded significant positive macroeconomic results
according to the WB, IMF and USAID.2 Regional experts however often do not agree with
this analysis.
The literature on foreign aid suggests that there is a price to pay for aid (Payer 1991, Mitchell
1991, Zolo 1992, Chomsky 1989). Donor countries give aid to encourage certain policies in
recipient countries. This leads to the hypothesis that the source of foreign aid has an impact
on political and economic policies and reforms. Generally speaking, increased levels of aid
from the East (USSR, China) have led to higher levels of state intervention, while aid from
the West has resulted in less governmental involvement with a move towards privatisation, a
liberalised market, and policies that reflect a more market-driven capitalist economic
framework (Lofgren 1993). Bennett’s (1995) research on the role of government in adjusting
economies looked at the capacity to assume new roles in the health sector, suggesting a new
paradigm:
As a result of changing ideologies, donor pressure and fiscal constraints, many
countries since the 1980s have experienced reforms in the role of government. Neoliberal thinking, put into practice through stabilisation and structural adjustment programmes, has advocated a reduction in the size and functions of the state. The new conventional view is that the state should not directly provide service, unless market
failure makes direct provision necessary. Rather, the state should become an indirect
provider, adopting a role, which ensures that essential services are provided, but not
necessarily producing or delivering these services (Bennet 1995:1).
The purpose for such governmental reforms is to encourage diversity of service providers
through greater private sector participation, service deregulation, and by contracting out
services (Bennet 1995). The state should serve more as an enabler and regulator, rather than a
provider and financier of services. Reforms should encourage competition, managerial
responsibility, accountability, and consumer choice (USAID 2002). Focusing on reforms that
have been implemented in developing countries, Bennet (1995) attempts to identify capacities
and preconditions necessary for successful reform. He concludes that only where considerable
experience exists is it possible to understand the factors contributing towards success of a
particular reform. Unfortunately, many reform measures have been implemented with little or
no evaluation of past success or failure. As a result, many reform programmes executed under
development assistance do not produce the desired results (World Bank 2001).
This was the situation in the US-led Egyptian agricultural reforms of the 1980s. Mitchell’s
(1991) case study illustrates the failure of reforms that are not homegrown or well researched.
Much can be learned from this historical account that should be considered as HSR initiatives
take place in Egypt. Mitchell argues in America’s Egypt: Discourse of the Development
Industry that while millions of Egyptians benefited from the development work of USAID
and the World Bank, the price may not have been worth it.
For decades, USAID and WB have introduced reform measures in developing countries by
persuading willing elites in developing countries that American funds, technology, and
management-styles will be the solution. By looking at a reform case study that has
measurable results much can be learned. Although this study concerns agriculture (and not
health), the method of defining the problem and introducing American methods as a solution
is nearly the same as HSR. It is therefore useful to investigate this case further.
USAID and WB expertise and intelligence narrowly defined Egypt’s economic problems as
due primarily to overpopulation and substandard technology and management. Mitchell
(1991) argued that this narrow definition suited their development objectives. However,
Mitchell contends that the real problem was “powerlessness and social inequality,” issues that
the researcher will later argue are relevant to policymaking in HSR. This powerlessness and
inequality state Mitchell (1991), Ibrahim (1995) and Stork (1995), extends to all resources,
including land, water, health care, and political and social resources.
The agricultural reforms of 1980s focused on investing in US technology (to give higher
yields), US-style management (to become more efficient with the resources available), and
privatisation (for cash crops). These are the same foci of health sector reform today. USAID’s
powerful political stature – and its ability to find willing elites in Egypt who would summarily
benefit from rent-seeking as hundreds of millions of dollars were brought into the country –
made the reform possible.
USAID worked exclusively with political and economic elites (policymakers) making it easy
to form and implement US-style policy solutions without input from farmers or the
peasantry, a situation this researcher argues has repeated itself to some degree within HSR.
The outcome of the agricultural reform was higher production costs, instead of the promised
higher yields. Financial imbalances occurred and political, social and land equalities were
accentuated. Farmers were forced to spend more for technological advancements, while their
yield, and therefore income, declined. Agricultural reform initiatives were first financed by
grants from USAID but over the years this financing was transformed into WB loans signed
by the GOE, by then dependent on carrying out such reforms. This research shows that HSR
has begun to follow the same pattern. HSR initiatives in the early 1980s began with grant
funds from USAID. As the reform initiatives continued and dependency ensued, the GOE
signed loans to finance ongoing HSR initiatives.
This outcome within the agricultural sector created unforeseen problems. In order to repay
loans, USAID and WB encouraged the farming of cash crops. Increasingly less land was
devoted to growing staple foods for Egyptian consumption and more to exported cash crops
like cotton, which was volatile to international market changes, taxation and embargoes. Yet
the GOE, at the insistence (through loan conditionalities) of USAID and WB, continued to cut
subsidises for the growth of staple foods and encouraged subsidised farming of cotton and
livestock. Egypt now no longer produces enough staple foods to feed its people and is
dependent on wheat imports from the US. With the enormous growth in livestock farming,
Egypt now produces more food for livestock than for people. As a result of these USinitiated reform policies, Egypt became the world’s largest importer of US wheat (Mitchell
1991).
Ironically, tens of billions of dollars per year is spent by the US government to keep
American wheat farmers from planting, thus controlling the supply and driving up the
consumer price of wheat. At the same time, Egyptian wheat farmers are preventing from
receiving subsidies from the GOE.
Prior to these reforms, staple crop production had kept pace with needs of the growing
population, allowing Egypt to feed its people. During these reforms, livestock production
doubled that of staple food production in terms of farmed land. Today most of the US wheat
purchased by Egypt is bought on loans contributing to the external debt of Egypt. HSR has
taken a similar course. It was financed entirely by grants until 1997, when the MOHP signed
a loan with the WB in the amount of $200 million to pay for ongoing HSR initiatives.
USAID, a state agency, part of the US public sector, has identified as a main goal the cutting
back of the public sector in Egypt through privatisation, cutting of subsidies, and decreasing
the public sector work force. However, by its very presence within the Egyptian public sector,
Mitchell (1991) argues, USAID is strengthening the wealth, power, and resources of the state
and state elites. He argues that USAID is thus part of the problem it claims to want to
eradicate. Yet because the discourse of development must present itself as rational,
intelligent, and unbiased, USAID is not likely to diagnose itself as an integral aspect of the
problem.
Mitchell further argues that this difficulty reflects a much larger fallacy central to this thesis,
that of GG and the neo-liberal economic ideology, which advocates for expanding
privatisation throughout all sectors. The WB and USAID state that the problems of a country
like Egypt are in part due to a lack of GG and restrictions placed on the private sector, which
prohibit Egypt from competing in a globalised world-market. Perhaps the most significant
counter argument to this view is exemplified in the world grain market. One of the donor
arguments against Egypt producing the staple foods it needs is that it cannot compete in a
world market against the low grain prices of US farmers. Yet low US grain prices are a
product of US subsidies and market controls advantageous to the US. While the results of
HSR policies have yet to emerge, reforms in other sectors such as agriculture are illustrative
of what to avoid.
Donors, especially, USAID and the WB have played a significant role in Egypt since 1975
and continue today. Who has benefited from the policies being implemented is not always
clear. What is known is that almost every penny of the $15 billion budget for economic
assistance to Egypt from USAID (1974 to 1991) was allocated directly to US corporations (in
the US) for the purchase of US grains, US technology, US technical assistance, and other
American goods (Mitchell 1991). Still one must state that millions of Egyptians have
benefited from US economic assistance, at least in the short term. Benefits, whether short or
long term, have come at the price of dependence on American-style management, technology,
technical assistance, machinery, food imports, and enormous debt. The result is that vast US
government subsidies are provided to the so-called private sector in the US both directly by
the purchase of billions of dollars of products and technical expertise through USAID and
also indirectly by converting Egypt into a huge US market.
The role and influence of USAID goes beyond the economic realm. Today the US is the
largest supplier of Egyptian imports. This dependence and the ensuing levels of debt have
given the US a powerful position of influence within Egypt. With this strong foothold,
USAID conducts cabinet level dialogue with the GOE on macroeconomic and foreign policy.
This policy leverage has now become the principal criterion for which USAID development
projects in Egypt are evaluated Mitchell (1991), Makram-Ebeid (1989), Esposito (1996) and
Mernissi (1992).
(NOTE THIS IS AN EXCERPT AND NOT A FULL TEXT DOCUMENT
Monday’s Mt (10/24/22): What makes a cold war turn hot?
By most definitions a cold war is an extended period of hostile relations between two countries or blocks of countries that seldom flares up into direct large-scale armed conflict. Incidents of violence and coercion occur in cold wars, such as proxy wars, arms races, terrorism, espionage and sabotage, and propaganda wars.
Obviously, preventing a direct war and quickly de-escalating violence when it starts are key. The U.S.-Soviet Cold War (I’ll capitalize this one for convenience) turned hot regularly, like in Korea and Vietnam. Most of the violence was confined to indirect, yet bloody, proxy wars. Millions died and at least twice we almost stumbled into nuclear war. On Monday we could talk about lessons learned from The Cold War about how to keep a cold war cold and/or how to prevent getting embroiled in them in the first place.
Or, we could focus on how to manage the cold wars we are in right now. I would say there are at least three: China, Russia, and (grudgingly on the list because it’s so much weaker a country) Iran. Vladimir Putin has been very upfront about getting Russia’s empire back, even if it means invading one neighbor after another under the shield of its large nuclear arsenal. That we are in a cold war with China is hard to deny anymore, in both, military, economic, and cultural spheres. China’s strongman Xi just upped his threats to Taiwan this week. Since great power competition may be the new master narrative of the 21st century, and frightening new weapons technologies are proliferating, we also ought to debate how to contain our ongoing cold wars.
Lessons come from abroad, too. India and Pakistan have been in a tense on again off again cold/hot war for 60 years. They fought four major shooting wars now each possesses nuclear weapons. The Korea standoff is almost 70 years old. Israel remains frozen in cold war with most of its neighbors, notably Iran. Iran also is in cold war, complete with a brutal proxy war, with Saudi Arabia. The Wiki article linked to below lists other such conflicts from the past. Oddly, it does not include early 20th-century Europe, which endured decades of cold war-like uneasy, shifting alliances and arms races before it all blew up in their faces in 1914.
So, Monday’s topic seems practically urgent, given Putin and Xi and the Middle East and past and present – but also one of those topics that could go in all directions at once if we do not limit it a bit. Since it is not clear where the mtg will go, I’ve overwhelmed you with readings. They focus on the chances of nuclear escalation in Ukraine, lessons learned from USSR Cold War, and how to apply those lessons to “cold war II” (China).
Me? I think we should try to focus not on current events but rather on the literal topic question: Based on history and common-sense, what kinds of events/accidents, internal political pressures, leadership mistakes, and miscommunications tend to trigger shooting wars between antagonistic powers that do not really want to go to war? Ukraine and Taiwan are the most obvious places those lessons might need to be applied to. But they will not be the last.
OPTIONAL BACKGROUND READINGS –
- Cold war – Wikipedia. Definition and brief list of some thru history.
- Ukraine: Will Putin escalate wildly?
- Nuclear use is more likely than in Cuban missile crisis! Recommended.
- The Age of the Predatory Nuclear State has arrived. Recommended.
- Wrong. Best guess by this expert = war ends when Russian military ordered home so they can be used by Russian factions against each other.
- Old Soviet-US Cold War:
- Cuban missile crisis led us much closer to nuclear war than is commonly thought. In 1983 we came within seconds of nuclear war.
- USA did not “defeat” USSR, and that myth has been destructive to us. Recommended.
- China-US cold war:
- Six mistakes that made the Cold War worse and how to avoid them with China. 10pp but highly recommended.
- New and still-ongoing cold wars, lessons from?
- We are in one big cold war: USA v. China, with Russia as China’s junior partner.
- Proxy wars – they’re back.
NEXT WEEK (10/31): No mtg.
Monday’s Mtg (9/12/22): 21 years later – 9/11 as history.
The attacks of 9/11/01 were 21 years ago Sunday (!). Since the median age of Americans is around 43, that means one-half of us were no older than 22 on that terrible day – and something like 30% were not yet born. Although only a tiny fraction of the adult U.S. population directly participated in fighting the subsequent “global war on terror” (GWOT), it still stands as the most traumatic national tragedy that most living Americans experienced.
A lot has changed in those 21 years. Our assassination in July of Al Qaeda’s long-time second in command Ayman Al-Zawahiri basically pretty much finishes the destruction of AQ. The “Islamic State” that sprouted up in Syria and Iraq has been all but defeated, too. Most recent terrorism inside the USA has been of the home-grown, right-wing variety.
Since I took it over in 2010, Civilized Conversation has had few discussions directly about terrorism except as it relates to other issues (2021 lessons from Afghan war, 2017 U.S.-Saudi relations, 2016 Are we paying too high a price to fight terrorism? 2015 and others Iraq and Syria, etc.)
Transnational terrorism will remain a real problem – especially since future terrorists no doubt will get access to drones, cyber weapons, AI, and other emerging war technologies. But maybe after 21 years we finally can look at terrorism more dispassionately than we did when 9/11 and the Iraq/Afghan wars were fresh wounds. We could ask questions about issues like
DISCUSSION QUESTIONS –
- Terrorism as a threat: In retrospect, how big a threat was AQ and its allies/successors (like ISIS)? Compared to what? How bad will future threat be – with all the weapons future terrorists will have and global strife over water, climate, ethno-nationalism is as bad as we fear?
- Public response: Yes 9/11 was ghastly. But, did the U.S. public overreact? Did politicians, news media, others hype the threat and fear for ulterior motives? Any lessons about how easy it is to manipulate a frightened public?
- Political leadership: Did our leaders overreact (not just GWB)? Are there limits on how truthful they can be with us? Iraq war. Not leaving Afghanistan sooner.
- Defining the enemy. Did we define the enemy too broadly and/or give the president too much power to prosecute the war?
- Causes of terrorism: Did we think too little and too simplistically about this? What does cause the rise of AQ/ISIS-like groups? Does it really have nothing to do with our actions around the world?
OPTIONAL BACKGROUND READINGS –
- “The World 9/11 Made.” Among other effects it weakened the USA and made us all realize how connected we all are in a globalized world. Recommended.
- It transformed global security. 5 great short essays on human rights, surveillance abuses, and law. Recommended.
- It massively expanded U.S. presidential power (war making, surveillance, immigration restrictions, etc.).
- Our response to 9/11 contributed to our national decline. By a center-left scholar.
- If 9/11 was a test, the USA failed it miserably. Recommended.
- Longer + more technical:
- We’ve made ourselves safer, but at enormous cost.
- No. GWOT was a gigantic failure. By a Libertarian CATO scholar.
- Detailed look at changing U.S. public opinion re GWOT over time. Much shorter version here.
NEXT WEEK (9/19/): TBD next week.
Monday’s Mtg (5/8/22): Who would the United States go to war to protect?
We can’t get any timelier than this topic. We are giving a LOT of military aid to Ukraine to help them wear down their Russian invaders. President Biden just announced a $33 billion aid package, on top of the substantial weaponry that is being supplied by our NATO and non-NATO allies. From what I’m reading, this has helped Vladimir Putin to convince himself that this is a war against the entire Western Alliance.
This topic goes way beyond helping Ukraine wage a defensive war, obviously. Did you know that at least formally we are treaty-bound to come to the aid of any of about 50 countries if they are attacked? This is about one-quarter of the countries on earth. About one-half of the 50 are in NATO (27, minus us). Most of the rest (15) are Latin American signatories of the 1947 Rio Treaty. Plus there are 4 in Southeast Asia (Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, and the Philippines); Japan; and Korea. At least one analysis found that If you add in other nations we likely would go to war to defend – like Israel, Taiwan, and Mexico – the number rises to 67 countries! The 50 nations, BTW, spend 60% of global military spending, in contrast to the less than 20% spent by China and Russia and Iran and North Korea combined.
These numbers sure make it sound like we have overcommitted to help other countries protect themselves. But that doesn’t make it true. It really all depends on how we view our national interests and role in the world. I propose we discuss the topic using the old diagram a sentence approach. This might make it clearer about what we have pledged to do, why, for whose benefit, and thus how likely we are to go to war in faraway places in what promises to be a chaotic near future. Contorting the grammar a bit yields three main discussion areas, all of which are contestable, IMO:
- Going to War: What does that mean these days? Declaring war? Invoking some treaty’s mutual defense clause? A massive U.S. invasion with/without allies to oust an aggressor regime? Send special ops troops into harm’s way? Give military training? Sell/give our side weapons (which ones, to do what)? Supply intelligence info – even tactical or targeting data? Cyberwar support, even for offense (we helped Israel sabotage Iran’s nuke program)? Economic sanctions? Threaten or start war crimes proceedings? Ink new alliances?
- The United States would do it to…: Who is this “we?” who makes these decisions? Congress? (Har) The President? What role do elites like the mainstream and right-wing news media and big corporations play? What about the influence of general public opinion and ethnic lobbies? Foreign countries via diplomacy, threats, promises?
- …Protect Whom? Our country, the country under attack, or other countries (that might be invaded next)? Their people, their democracy, or just the regime we prefer dealing with or for regional stability. To safeguard the liberal international order (See 2019 CivCon mtg)? For access to cheap oil or other resources? To help big U.S. corporations? To protect U.S. leadership role or “credibility?”
I don’t have a lot of good readings for you this week because I don’t have much time to research. Too bad, given the importance of this topic. Luckily, these are really meaty questions IMO, and we have some CivCon members that know a lot about these issues. I will give the usual short opening and then we can learn from them and each other.
OPTIONAL BACKGROUND READINGS –
- Past: Where/for whom have we gone to war?
- List of all U.S. military interventions since 1776. Hundreds, even if many/some were by request, for legit self-defense (our WWII “invasion” of Belgium), or for arguably a good reason.
- Counterterrorism: In 2019 we operated in 80 countries just to do this.
- Military bases: We have 750 in 80 countries. (Some are very small/minor outposts)
- Future: Who are we obliged to defend?
- At least 50 countries.
- Maybe as many as 67.
- Why?
- That is the big question, isn’t it? Benefits to whom versus costs to whom?
- FYI: “Just War” theory is a doctrine concerning when war is morally justified and what conduct during war is moral. Bullet point summary of its principles. Arguably irrelevant because USA always finds a way to morally justify its wars.
- Public opinion:
- Past wars: Dems/GOP mostly view our big past wars as justified, but Republicans support going to war much more in the abstract.
- Future Wars: Libs/cons differ a lot on threats we face and what we should focus on protecting.
- Taiwan: Would we fight for it? Should we?
- Israel: Almost $250 billion in U.S. military aid since 1946. Egypt got $150B. Both are more than Afghanistan or Iraq got (excludes direct U.S. war spending).
Relevant Civilized Conversation mtgs –
- 2021: Afghanistan – Final lessons finally learned?
- 2019: How does U.S. foreign policy benefit regular Americans?
- 2016: How serious are the threats America faces?
NEXT WEEK (5/16): COVID pandemic: What have we learned?
Monday’s Mtg (9/13/21): Afghanistan – Final lessons finally learned?
America’s longest war is now over. It lasted just shy of 20 years, although the combat phase was declared over in 2014. According to this article, the war cost the USA about $1 trillion in direct budgetary costs and maybe up to $2.3 trillion all-in, after adding in other war-related expenses at DOD; veterans care; aid to allies; and interest on the debt to pay for it all (taxes were never raised to pay for the war).
That’s money. In human life terms, about 2,300 American soldiers were killed and 20,000 wounded over 20 years, – mostly before 2014. I believe this does not include the PTSD cases, thousands of traumatic brain injuries, and psychological scars. Throw in another 1,200 coalition troops dead, 64,000 Afghan soldiers and police fatalities (officially), 500+ civilian contractors, and, unofficially via a new study, close to 50,000 Afghan civilians. Altogether, all of these costs become very large, especially for a war most Americans stopped noticing years ago.
And all of this to lose, right? Well, yeah. But how damaging a defeat this is will only be fully revealed in time. The answer will turn on future events, but also on how we answer or remember how out govt allegedly answered some pretty basic questions. Like –
- Goals of the war: What were they and did we accomplish some of them despite the ugly ending? Did the goals change over time and why? If legitimate became pointless, then when and why, exactly – and why did we not act on it sooner?
- Alternatives: Could anything have been done differently at key times – specially early in the war – to get things to turn out differently? Answering, “somehow surely” doesn’t cut it, even though the elite news media and 101st Keyboard Conservative Division keep repeating it.
- Admitting defeat: Why is it so hard for the USA to end a failed war? What is the “blob” and what is its role, if any?
- Future wars/Elites: Is the era of nation building and humanitarian interventions over, as this person (also linked to below) argues?
- Future wars/Public: How willing will Americans (and allies) be to support future far away military ventures, either justified or unjustified ones?
- World: Effects on the region: Pakistan, China, Iran, etc.? Does leaving Afghanistan like this make us appear weak – or sensible/realistic? How much does the always-invoked U.S. “credibility” really matter?
- Human Rights: How bad for the Afghan people? Will and should this set back the cause of humanitarian interventions (albeit that’s not why we invaded or stayed)?
- Other key questions you may have.
Ultimately, whether we learn the right lessons from this debacle will determine the total, final costs to the United States of the Afghan war. Hence, our topic wording. By Monday I’ll have a list of possible Lessons Learned I’ll use to guide or discussion and keep it on track. I’ll probably divide them into categories we can tackle in turn, like lessons related to military failures, domestic war politics/The Blob and Media, terrorism, nation building & democracy-spreading, limits of U.S. power, humanitarianism, etc.
Below is a dozen (!) articles on lessons learned from the war, but only 3-4 are recommended as most useful. Reading them will help us from descending into the inane, “who lost Afghanistan” level of debate.
Reminders: (1) We’re outside at Panera now so dress for it. (2) Unvaccinated people are not welcome. (3) We need topic ideas for October – January. Religion? Culture? Families? Off the beaten path ideas appreciated.
OPTIONAL BACKGROUND READINGS –
- Biden’s fault:
- To blame him is dishonest, lazy, or ignorant thinking. Recommended.
- This ugly smear of Biden is typical of conservative rhetoric. Read it to believe it.
- Pre-Biden/others at fault:
- Bush’s early mistakes helped to make defeat inevitable (but it might have been anyway). Recommended.
- Obama, Biden, Bush, everybody knew Afghan govt could not stand against the Taliban – mainly because Pakistan helped Taliban – yet all pretended otherwise.
- Trump’s last-minute deal with the Taliban ensured the super-sudden collapse the Right now blames Biden for. To be fair, Trump did promise to end the war. So did Biden. #1 recommended if u don’t know Trump did this.
- U.S. Army: Do its leaders bear a lot of blame because they failed to train the Afghan military, knew it, and lied about it? Interesting.
- Articles on lessons learned:
- One, giant lesson: The post-Cold-War era is over. The neoliberal project to reorder the world failed. It’s time to return to realism and worry about China, Russia, other problems, not nation building/transforming far-away countries where we have few interests. Recommended, centrist.
- We never knew the country and arrogantly assumed we could rebuild it. Recommended; very liberal commentator but he DOES know the region.
- BUT PLEASE: Don’t abandon U.S. commitment to human rights and democracy, no matter how unevenly followed.
NEXT WEEK (9/20): Over-population or over-consumption – which one is the bigger problem?
Monday’s Mtg: Islam’s Future.
Islam is a vast and diverse faith, both demographically and in terms of cultural and even religious beliefs. About 1.8 billion people are Muslim, one-fifth of humanity. Only 20% of them are Arabs living in the Middle East. About 400 million Muslims total live in Indonesia and Hindu-majority India. Islam may become the world’s most largest religious faith by 2060.
Yet, the roughly 50 majority-Muslim nations contribute only 5% to global GDP. Islam is beset with many serious problems, such as a “democracy deficit,” failed states, lack of gender equality, radical political movements, and constant interference by the West and other nations and forces.
With all of this diversity and such a long and varied list of intractable problems, how can we generalize about the Islam’s future?
Well, someone has to. There is a lot of misinformation about Islam in the West, as we discussed once in a meeting on Islamophobia. (We’ve discussed Islam many times – see links). Also, Majority-Muslim countries will remain important players on the world stage in the 21st century. The Middle East, North Africa, South Asia, and other regions will have to address in their own way the 21st century’s emerging big problems (like climate change and economic problems), plus some of their own if they are going to thrive and develop. And yes, just as the rest of the world exports some of its problems to Islamic countries, they may continue to return the favor.
Since we cannot hope to discuss every major trauma or issue facing Islamic regions and their solutions, we will have to limit the meeting to either a broad, sweeping look at what forces may drive Islam’s development or focus on specific countries and problems (like Syria, Palestine, Iran, or Pakistan; or Uighurs in China, Sunni/Shia issues, youth bulge, or authoritarianism govts or radical political movements).
Rather than ask you to read much about specific countries, here are some readings on our broad topic and some cross-cutting conflicts and issues that get little attention in the day-to-day U.S. news.
OPTIONAL BACKGROUND READINGS –
Muslim demographics and beliefs –
- ABCs of Muslim demographics (and a bit on beliefs) around the world and in the USA. Recommended.
- Skim this for a hint of the immense diversity of belief within Islam. For more, see exec sum of long 2013 report, “What the World’s Muslims Believe About Religion, Politics, and Society.” Recommended.
Problems and challenges –
- Islam’s worst problems:
- 5 biggest right now according to leaders in 52 Islamic countries. You might be surprised.
- Another non US-made list of Islam’s worst problems. .
- The Muslim world’s question: What happened to us? Recommended and NOT by Bernard Lewis.
- The religious roots of Middle East conflicts. Hard but good.
Islam’s Future –
- Sharp divides:
- Middle East – “Resistance” (to U.S./West/Israel) or “revolution” (against corrupt/brutal regimes at home)? Recommended.
- Islam – Salafis versus Islamists.
- Somewhat pessimistic: Radical Islamism is not dying out yet.
- Islam and democracy:
- They are compatible, especially since “democracy” has multiple meanings even in the West. Or: No, Islam and liberalism have trouble co-existing.
- A middle ground POV.
- What all religious fundamentalisms have in common = A reaction to modernity’s disruptions. The Islamist version is fading, as are all the others. NYT.
FYI, related CivCon mtgs –
- 2019: Is Israeli-Palestinian peace possible?
- 2017: Turkey and the future of moderate Islamism. 2016: The sources of Islamist radicalism.
- 2015: Who is to blame for Iraq and Syria? 2014: For the Arab Spring’s failure?
- 2013 America’s Islamophobia industry.
NEXT WEEK (3/29): No Meeting.
April 5: Modern-day gulags and what can be done about them.
Monday’s Mtg (12/7/20): Will Trump succeed sabotaging Biden’s presidency and Americans’ faith in our democracy?
Our topic this week is unavoidable. It arises from the widespread fear that President Trump, out of pique, and his outgoing Administration, out of ideological conviction, are trying to destroy Americans’ faith in democracy and sabotage the incoming Biden Administration.
There can be no doubt that Trump is guilty of the first charge. We’ve been watching him do it daily since election day – and even for months before! Forget his refusal to admit or formally concede defeat. He has repeatedly denounced the results as fraudulent and woven increasingly ridiculous conspiracy theories to explain how that could have happened. Massive voter fraud by illegal immigrants or by shadowy figures turning in millions of fake ballots. Collusion by thousands of poll workers and state election officials. Rigged voting machines. And anything else he can think of that might work regardless of consequences to the country of spreading such beliefs. All of this to convince his voters that an election with an outcome he and they didn’t like must have been fraudulent.
Sure, he has lost his quixotic battle to flat out overturn the outcome. In court he was 1 for 39 at one point, and then people stopped counting. But, he continues to make unhinged claims that the election was stolen and Biden is an illegitimate president.
And, incredibly, it is working. Spectacularly!! About 70% to 85% of Republican voters now say they believe Biden did not legitimately win the election. They believe Trump, not the evidence. Nearly every, single high-level GOP official has either joined in or stayed silent and refused to defend the Constitution they are sworn to uphold. Mission accomplished. Unless, of course, you believe that a president deliberately undermining citizens’ faith in our democracy, the legitimacy of a free and fair election, and the peaceful transfer of power is not a monstrous betrayal of his oath of office and an assault on the rule of law and on the already frayed fabric that holds our society together.
If there is evidence or an argument that the above is false, feel free to present it Monday at the mtg, and you will be heard respectfully. But until then, I feel the only real questions for us on this part of our topic involve the “why.” Why did so many Trump votes believe all of this, why is the entire GOP leadership complicit, and (most importantly) how enduring will the damage prove to be?
However, the second part of our “sabotage” question – whether Trump’s lame duck changes to policy are sabotaging Biden or the country – is a bit trickier. Trump is still the President, with the full powers of the office. Yes, he says nothing about the pandemic that has killed 300,000 Americans. Behind the scenes, his Administration may or may not be doing a decent job of preparing for the immense challenge of vaccinating 320 million Americans (not sharing their plans with Biden’s people is a bad sign).
Lame duck presidents typically mainly tread water and help with the transition unless events compel otherwise. But, there have been many exceptions. Defeated presidents sometimes hurry to accomplish unfinished policy business they consider important to the country or/and their legacies. Sometimes they deliberately box in their successor by making the policies hard to overturn (e.g., by passing a law or getting court rulings).
So, for this sub-topic, we have to know a few things, like:
- What important policies is the Trump Administration still trying to put in place?
- Which can justly be called “sabotage” rather than “things Democrats oppose?”?
- How hard will it be to reverse these policies for the Biden Administration, the courts, or the (probably) still bitterly divided Congress?
Below are some articles that debate sabotage. Mostly they deal with policy sabotage, but some are about how much faith in democracy Trump has destroyed. My opening remarks will focus on policy changes and why some might be called sabotage. I will mostly leave for our discussion the whole “let’s destroy Americans’ faith in their democracy that so many died protecting because my feelings are hurt” thing.
OPTIONAL BACKGROUND READINGS –
Faith in Democracy –
- 70% GOPers say Biden stole the election. The % keeps growing.
- WHY were they so easily persuaded and why are GOP leaders so willing to let them? A must-read.
- Is “presidency was stolen we’ll just never be able to prove it” now the moderate position in the GOP?
Domestic policy sabotage?
- Refusing to cooperate with Biden transition teams at key agencies. The most damaging sabotage?
- Refusing to pass a sufficient new stimulus package (many emergency benefits expire 12/31) or exhort the public to wear masks and act safely.
- [Sunday] Vaccine distribution: Will Trump Admin. screw that up until Jan 21?
- The rush to weaken environmental and worker protections. Recommended.
- Full list of known “midnight regulations” in motion. Lowering immigrant farm worker wages, excluding scientific input into science policymaking, radically narrowing the grounds for asylum eligibility, etc. Some are benign; some YMMV, some sound benign but are horrible, IMO. Ask DavidG.
- Confirming Trump judges after he’s lost, violating a 120-year-old Senate tradition.
- Executive order [EO] to fire USG any employee involved in “policy” without cause – which could mean purging thousands for disloyalty to Trump or GOP agenda.
- EO outlawing 14th Amendment’s “birthright citizenship?” (clearly unconstitutional – but to this Supreme Court?)
- “Burrowing in:” Some Trump political appointees will convert to civil service jobs under Biden. (NOT as big a deal as liberals say, IMO. Article explains.)
Foreign policy sabotage?
- Overall: Light so many fires Biden can’t put them all out? Recommended.
- China: Many acts to lock in hostile relationship. If Biden reverses any of it, it’s “appeasement.”
- Middle East/Iran:
- Bringing us to the brink of war with Iran? Recommended.
- [Update Sunday: Link alleging Trump spurring a Sunni-Shia war deleted because it was a low quality article]
- To be fair, Trump helped negotiate peace agreements between Israel and several Persian Gulf nations.
Stopping any sabotage –
- What Democrats can do.
NEXT WEEK (Dec 14): What are the moral and psychological foundations of political beliefs?
Monday’s Mtg: Recent anti-govt mass protests overseas – what do they mean?
This was Nile’s idea. As our own national political crisis drags on and on, the rest of the world keeps turning. One recent major development has been mass anti-govt protests in a dozen countries. They include in Hong Kong, Chile, Bolivia, Ecuador, Lebanon, Iraq, and others. Some have been in developed countries, like the U.K. and France. (Mass protests ushered in the Trump Administration and surely will usher it out, probably involving at least some violence. But, that will be a topic for others Mondays.)
Popular protest against oppression and corruption have been a staple of the post-Cold War world. From the “color revolutions” in the former USSR in the 1990s to the Arab Spring in 2011 with others in between. Many failed, some partially succeeded, and some did even better. But now large-scale popular protests are popping up everywhere, not just in regions roiled by some big triggering event.
Nile asks, why? What is going on and what does it mean? To try to answer Nile’s question we could ask thing like:
DISCUSSION QUESTIONS –
- WHAT is happening where? Breaking developments. Specific countries of interest, especially Hong Kong and Latin America.
- WHY: Common/similar causes? E.g., in how their govts work/don’t’ work, how the people live, who is leading or doing the protesting (minority groups, the poor, propertied classes, etc.)?
- DEMANDS: What do protestors want? Common goals? Govts’ flexibility or red lines?
- USA ROLE: The world does not revolve around us. But, does all of this have anything to do with us?
— Do we bear any responsibility for the conditions being protested?
— Will protests and/or crackdowns harm or help our interests?
— Trump: Is the vacuum of US leadership a factor in the timing of protests or restraints on govt crackdowns? - PREDICTIONS: What are reasonable expectations for real reform, peaceful resolution, or revolution?
OPTIONAL BACKGROUND READINGS –
- Why are so many countries witnessing mass protests? Economist Mag.
Not Recommended.Too dismissive of protests as mere fashion. - The common element in Lebanon and Iraq: They are pro-nationalist movements against split-sectarian (shared minority rule) govts. Both recommended
- Trump’s disastrous failures all over Latin America are not helping. Recommended.
- More on specific countries:
- Bolivia’s coup: Revenge of the White minority. NYT. Non-NYT lengthy excerpt plus other thoughts here.
- Hong Kong: Did the protestors overreach?
- A new Lebanon is rising.
- Iraq rebellion is a huge deal. Recommended. Mass protests, 300+ dead, and thousands injured. The crackdown brings to mind Saddam’s “republic of fear.”
- After protests – Pathways to lasting change.
NEXT WEEK: Critical thinking – How can it be taught and learned?
More links – actual ideas for improving Israeli-Palestinian conflict
Sorry for the mediocre links this week. I forgot to include any that try to answer what the topic question asked. Here are two:
- Eight ideas for shrinking the problem. (Small steps – not peace, not two sovereign states.)
- Create a confederation: Two sovereign states with shared responsibilities.
Also, the level of violence Israel employs is under-reported here. (Yeah its the UN, but that doesn’t make them wrong.)
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