Tag Archives: Foreign Policy

Monday’s Mtg (4/10/23): What are Americans’ worst misconceptions about the rest of the world, and vice versa?

It is a holiday weekend, not a homework weekend.  For this topic on mutual misunderstandings between Americans and the rest of the world, let’s hope we can generate a lot of our discussion from group members’ direct experience.  We have immigrant members from many countries, people that have lived abroad, and a range of ages.  The latter is important because I do not want to get bogged down in 30–40-year-old stereotypes that newer generations have left behind.  (It is true that national/religious stereotypes often last for generations, but this is a well-rounded group so hopefully we have left in the past “all Americans are rich/arrogant” and “poor countries are hellholes,” “Arabs are violent” and other hackneyed beliefs.)

The vague wording hurts us, but not fatally, IMO.  Yes, there are 330 million Americans (225m adults), and asking what “we” believe about the rest of the world requires a lot of aggregating and generalizing.  The same is true the other way around.  The “rest of the world” is 200+ countries; thousands of cultures, ethnic groups, languages, etc.; a half dozen major religious faiths and hundreds of smaller ones; just to touch on the vast diversity of 7 billion non-Americans.  What do “we” and “they” think about each other, even at one snapshot moment in time, is not really a question with an answer.

Moreover, Americans themselves are sharply divided on core facts and beliefs about our own country, as we talked about last week.  Our country is in an internal Cold War over our history, culture, race, science, immigration’s value, the proper roles for govt/biz, and even the basic meaning of democracy and the Constitution.  As we discussed, regional sterotypes persist here.

What do “we” think about Islam and Mexico??  Many Americans are too saturated in myths and propaganda to know ourselves, much less others.   

Still, two very important reason led me to suggest this topic.

  1. Americans must be able to see ourselves as others see us – whether they are right or wrong about us.  Historically we do not do that very well, and catastrophes (for us and other countries) have followed.  If U.S. influence really is ebbing, seeing ourselves through 7 billion new sets of eyes will come to matter more and more. 
  2. There is always value in saying out loud our stereotypes and generalizations about others.  It helps us examine assumptions, facts, values, prejudices, etc.

Have a happy Easter weekend and I will see you on Monday.  Also, don’t forget to sign up for our spring party on April 30th at Nick’s house.

OPTIONAL BACKGROUND READINGS –

About us –

By us –

NEXT WEEK (4/17/23):  How will major world religions evolve in 21st century?

Monday’s Mtg Part II: Nile’s paper on U.S. foreign aid to Egypt (excerpt)

Notes: See next post down for the usual pre-mtg background from DavidG. I removed the footnotes from Nile’s paper to make it easier to read. Sorry for the late notice.

Nile Regina El Wardani, MPH, MPhil, PhD
Short Excerpt
The Historical Role of Donors and the Price of Aid:
A Case Study of Agriculture & AID in Egypt


Over the past five decades, Egypt has been a major recipient of foreign aid from many
sources including the U.S., Western Europe, Japan and international financial organisations
such as the Islamic Development Bank (IDB), the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (IBRD), the Soviet Union, Eastern European countries, China and many Arab
states. Largely because of the geo-political importance of Egypt to the West, and in line with
the Camp David Accord, Egypt remains the second largest recipient of USAID funds after
Israel.


US policy leverage, over the past three decades, has greatly influenced macroeconomic policy
in Egypt. Egypt’s path to a market-oriented economy following 40 years of heavy state
intervention in resource allocation has yielded significant positive macroeconomic results
according to the WB, IMF and USAID.2 Regional experts however often do not agree with
this analysis.


The literature on foreign aid suggests that there is a price to pay for aid (Payer 1991, Mitchell
1991, Zolo 1992, Chomsky 1989). Donor countries give aid to encourage certain policies in
recipient countries. This leads to the hypothesis that the source of foreign aid has an impact
on political and economic policies and reforms. Generally speaking, increased levels of aid
from the East (USSR, China) have led to higher levels of state intervention, while aid from
the West has resulted in less governmental involvement with a move towards privatisation, a
liberalised market, and policies that reflect a more market-driven capitalist economic
framework (Lofgren 1993). Bennett’s (1995) research on the role of government in adjusting
economies looked at the capacity to assume new roles in the health sector, suggesting a new
paradigm:


As a result of changing ideologies, donor pressure and fiscal constraints, many
countries since the 1980s have experienced reforms in the role of government. Neoliberal thinking, put into practice through stabilisation and structural adjustment programmes, has advocated a reduction in the size and functions of the state. The new conventional view is that the state should not directly provide service, unless market
failure makes direct provision necessary. Rather, the state should become an indirect
provider, adopting a role, which ensures that essential services are provided, but not
necessarily producing or delivering these services (Bennet 1995:1).

The purpose for such governmental reforms is to encourage diversity of service providers
through greater private sector participation, service deregulation, and by contracting out
services (Bennet 1995). The state should serve more as an enabler and regulator, rather than a
provider and financier of services. Reforms should encourage competition, managerial
responsibility, accountability, and consumer choice (USAID 2002). Focusing on reforms that
have been implemented in developing countries, Bennet (1995) attempts to identify capacities
and preconditions necessary for successful reform. He concludes that only where considerable
experience exists is it possible to understand the factors contributing towards success of a
particular reform. Unfortunately, many reform measures have been implemented with little or
no evaluation of past success or failure. As a result, many reform programmes executed under
development assistance do not produce the desired results (World Bank 2001).
This was the situation in the US-led Egyptian agricultural reforms of the 1980s. Mitchell’s
(1991) case study illustrates the failure of reforms that are not homegrown or well researched.
Much can be learned from this historical account that should be considered as HSR initiatives
take place in Egypt. Mitchell argues in America’s Egypt: Discourse of the Development
Industry that while millions of Egyptians benefited from the development work of USAID
and the World Bank, the price may not have been worth it.


For decades, USAID and WB have introduced reform measures in developing countries by
persuading willing elites in developing countries that American funds, technology, and
management-styles will be the solution. By looking at a reform case study that has
measurable results much can be learned. Although this study concerns agriculture (and not
health), the method of defining the problem and introducing American methods as a solution
is nearly the same as HSR. It is therefore useful to investigate this case further.


USAID and WB expertise and intelligence narrowly defined Egypt’s economic problems as
due primarily to overpopulation and substandard technology and management. Mitchell
(1991) argued that this narrow definition suited their development objectives. However,
Mitchell contends that the real problem was “powerlessness and social inequality,” issues that
the researcher will later argue are relevant to policymaking in HSR. This powerlessness and
inequality state Mitchell (1991), Ibrahim (1995) and Stork (1995), extends to all resources,
including land, water, health care, and political and social resources.


The agricultural reforms of 1980s focused on investing in US technology (to give higher
yields), US-style management (to become more efficient with the resources available), and
privatisation (for cash crops). These are the same foci of health sector reform today. USAID’s
powerful political stature – and its ability to find willing elites in Egypt who would summarily
benefit from rent-seeking as hundreds of millions of dollars were brought into the country –
made the reform possible.


USAID worked exclusively with political and economic elites (policymakers) making it easy
to form and implement US-style policy solutions without input from farmers or the
peasantry, a situation this researcher argues has repeated itself to some degree within HSR.
The outcome of the agricultural reform was higher production costs, instead of the promised
higher yields. Financial imbalances occurred and political, social and land equalities were
accentuated. Farmers were forced to spend more for technological advancements, while their
yield, and therefore income, declined. Agricultural reform initiatives were first financed by
grants from USAID but over the years this financing was transformed into WB loans signed
by the GOE, by then dependent on carrying out such reforms. This research shows that HSR
has begun to follow the same pattern. HSR initiatives in the early 1980s began with grant
funds from USAID. As the reform initiatives continued and dependency ensued, the GOE
signed loans to finance ongoing HSR initiatives.


This outcome within the agricultural sector created unforeseen problems. In order to repay
loans, USAID and WB encouraged the farming of cash crops. Increasingly less land was
devoted to growing staple foods for Egyptian consumption and more to exported cash crops
like cotton, which was volatile to international market changes, taxation and embargoes. Yet
the GOE, at the insistence (through loan conditionalities) of USAID and WB, continued to cut
subsidises for the growth of staple foods and encouraged subsidised farming of cotton and
livestock. Egypt now no longer produces enough staple foods to feed its people and is
dependent on wheat imports from the US. With the enormous growth in livestock farming,
Egypt now produces more food for livestock than for people. As a result of these USinitiated reform policies, Egypt became the world’s largest importer of US wheat (Mitchell
1991).


Ironically, tens of billions of dollars per year is spent by the US government to keep
American wheat farmers from planting, thus controlling the supply and driving up the
consumer price of wheat. At the same time, Egyptian wheat farmers are preventing from
receiving subsidies from the GOE.


Prior to these reforms, staple crop production had kept pace with needs of the growing
population, allowing Egypt to feed its people. During these reforms, livestock production
doubled that of staple food production in terms of farmed land. Today most of the US wheat
purchased by Egypt is bought on loans contributing to the external debt of Egypt. HSR has
taken a similar course. It was financed entirely by grants until 1997, when the MOHP signed
a loan with the WB in the amount of $200 million to pay for ongoing HSR initiatives.
USAID, a state agency, part of the US public sector, has identified as a main goal the cutting
back of the public sector in Egypt through privatisation, cutting of subsidies, and decreasing
the public sector work force. However, by its very presence within the Egyptian public sector,
Mitchell (1991) argues, USAID is strengthening the wealth, power, and resources of the state
and state elites. He argues that USAID is thus part of the problem it claims to want to
eradicate. Yet because the discourse of development must present itself as rational,
intelligent, and unbiased, USAID is not likely to diagnose itself as an integral aspect of the
problem.


Mitchell further argues that this difficulty reflects a much larger fallacy central to this thesis,
that of GG and the neo-liberal economic ideology, which advocates for expanding
privatisation throughout all sectors. The WB and USAID state that the problems of a country
like Egypt are in part due to a lack of GG and restrictions placed on the private sector, which
prohibit Egypt from competing in a globalised world-market. Perhaps the most significant
counter argument to this view is exemplified in the world grain market. One of the donor
arguments against Egypt producing the staple foods it needs is that it cannot compete in a
world market against the low grain prices of US farmers. Yet low US grain prices are a
product of US subsidies and market controls advantageous to the US. While the results of
HSR policies have yet to emerge, reforms in other sectors such as agriculture are illustrative
of what to avoid.


Donors, especially, USAID and the WB have played a significant role in Egypt since 1975
and continue today. Who has benefited from the policies being implemented is not always
clear. What is known is that almost every penny of the $15 billion budget for economic
assistance to Egypt from USAID (1974 to 1991) was allocated directly to US corporations (in
the US) for the purchase of US grains, US technology, US technical assistance, and other
American goods (Mitchell 1991). Still one must state that millions of Egyptians have
benefited from US economic assistance, at least in the short term. Benefits, whether short or
long term, have come at the price of dependence on American-style management, technology,
technical assistance, machinery, food imports, and enormous debt. The result is that vast US
government subsidies are provided to the so-called private sector in the US both directly by
the purchase of billions of dollars of products and technical expertise through USAID and
also indirectly by converting Egypt into a huge US market.


The role and influence of USAID goes beyond the economic realm. Today the US is the
largest supplier of Egyptian imports. This dependence and the ensuing levels of debt have
given the US a powerful position of influence within Egypt. With this strong foothold,
USAID conducts cabinet level dialogue with the GOE on macroeconomic and foreign policy.
This policy leverage has now become the principal criterion for which USAID development
projects in Egypt are evaluated Mitchell (1991), Makram-Ebeid (1989), Esposito (1996) and
Mernissi (1992).


(NOTE THIS IS AN EXCERPT AND NOT A FULL TEXT DOCUMENT

Monday’s Mtg (3/20/23): Who really benefits from U.S. foreign aid?

Our last topic in March is Nile’s idea.  Most of the commonly-heard criticisms and defenses of U.S. foreign aid are highly ideological and/or simplistic.  Why spend money on foreigners when people are hurting here?  Why spend so little on aid compared to defense spending – under $50B vs. over $800B, respectively?  Foreign aid makes countries dependent on charity, not self-reliance.  (I know, I know.  But there is a more sophisticated version of this claim than the “welfare hurts the poor” garbage it sounds like).  Too much of our aid is really given for strategic reasons, or not enough of it is.  Etc.

In fact, there are many spirited debates about foreign aid coming from within the global development community.  They do not tend to be anchored in ideology or stereotypes.  There are genuine concerns over whether donor nations have the right priorities, how well they coordinate their efforts, how much control recipient nations should have over the aid, and how effective aid programs are overall.  Some of the studies on effectiveness are disheartening. 

Nile brings up another important critique.  Unlike many other donor countries, almost all U.S. foreign aid is funneled through intermediary organizations.  They include corporations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) like universities and private charities, and faith-based and community groups.  Almost all of our aid gets funneled through a mere 75 organizations!  Only 6% of them are based in recipient countries, and only 4% of our aid goes directly to the national governments! 

Why do we do it this way?  I believe the official answer is that it makes our aid programs more efficient; easier to evaluate (better data are kept etc.); and less corrupt, especially in countries with very corrupt governments.  Nile and others ask whether it is more the other way around?  Does passing all our aid through American entities give them their “cut” at the expense of the global poor?  “Foreign aid helps American companies too” also makes it easier to sell to a skeptical U.S. public. 

I am agnostic on this one.  I do know that the U.S. Agency For International Development (USAID) is a notorious bureaucracy, but I also believe that most of its employees and contractors are trying to do the best job they can, given the strictures and circumstances they must operate under.

I will open our meeting Monday with a 5-minute summary of the ABCs of U.S. foreign aid.  I will then turn to Nile for her perspective.  I will also try to find out more about those 75 organizations that deliver the services/goods/monies and how they do it.  USAID and other big global aid agencies (like the World Bank), if they do nothing else, produce lots of internal evaluations.  Maybe sifting through some of them would help.

OPTIONAL BACKGROUND READINGS –

Basic facts about U.S. Foreign Aid –

  • In words, from a center-right perspective: Amounts, goals, effectiveness, etc. 
    Or, see this interactive global map of where U.S. aid goes. [Note: A LOT of U.S. foreign military aid is not in here because of the way they define foreign aid. DavidG will explain]
  • FYI Summary – Total = about $48 billion, 35% is military/security aid.  (<1% of total budget.  DoD gets >$800B.).  Some U.S. aid goes to almost every nation but it is highly concentrated in 4-5 countries because of military assistance or strategic value.  There are 4 big objectives:  Peace and security, investing in people (edu, health), improving governance, promoting economic growth, humanitarian assistance.
  • Key for our discussionMost U.S. aid goes to intermediaries – almost always U.S. non-profits and companies. 

Does it work?

Nile’s Point – Does our aid mainly benefit U.S. orgs?

NEXT WEEK (March 27):  No Mtg.

Monday’s Mtg (3/13/23): The Surveillance Century, Part II – Government surveillance.

On February 6th we discussed the “Surveillance Century,”  We devoted all of the mtg to the almost purely private sector origins of our now omnipresent (and increasingly omniscient) mass surveillance system.  The background readings for the mtg and my introduction tried to make the case that Google/Alphabet, Facebook/Meta, Apple, and a handful of other Big Tech firms have created something brand new: A system that is moving towards virtually constant on-line and off-line surveillance of our daily lives.  This is an unprecedented new kind of power, highly concentrated.   Especially after it is fully married to AI, surveillance capitalism potentially will be owners and the sole arbiter of a huge capability to monitor us and predict and probably manipulate our behavior for their private profit.

At the meeting, I think a lot of people thought we were talking about targeted advertising, or something benign.  Maybe this thesis is overwrought – or at least premature.  And yes, we get many benefits from a wired world.

Fine.  Now, try imagining that this hyper-concentrated private surveillance apparatus gets merged with government’s law enforcement and national security powers.  Worried now?  You should be, from what I have read.

The key to understanding why is to forget the debates about govt spying that sprung up right after 9/11.  Secret warrants, NSA hoovering up our meta-data, and so forth still matter because they still abuse their power.  (See article below on this.)  But increasingly it is OBE, replaced by governments that just plug into or purchase the new tools for total surveillance that we have let the private sector create completely in secret already and outside of constraint by law or oversight or regulation. 

Governments, including ours, are already doing it.  China’s surveillance state is the most advanced and totalitarian-like, by all accounts.  But it is exporting the tools of mass surveillance control to other countries.  “Digital authoritarianism” is being built in Vietnam, Iran, and many other nations.   As discussed below, there also is a huge private global spyware sector, and some of its leading firms have few scruples about who they sell to.

Governments in the USA use some of these tools.  Which ones and how extensively we do not fully know.  Law enforcement and immigration enforcement agencies appear to be in the lead.  More is coming.  Every week it seems new revelations about U.S. govt surveillance abuses come out, even if no one seems to care.

Let’s do our part to change that.  On Monday I will give some short opening remarks to try to convey the immense scope and scale of what governments and corporations are doing in the mass surveillance realm, often in concert.  Then we can discuss it. 

I listed a bunch of optional readings below, just to be thorough.  But the first two will suffice to get you a bit up to speed.  I also attached a “Guide to protecting yourself” for your personal protection against this stuff.  It is from a highly reputable source.

A FEW MORE OPTIONAL BACKGROUND READINGS –

Recommended key articles –

USA –

Globally –

Different POVs and practical advice –

NEXT WEEK (3/20/23):  Who really benefits from U.S. foreign aid?

Monday’s Mtg (3/6/23): Is NATO at war with Russia now over Ukraine?

Civilized Conversation discussed the Russo-Ukrainian war in March 2022, one month after it started.  We focused mainly on the war’s origins, including how rapidly Ukraine would be crushed and who was to blame (Vladimir Putin alone, Ukraine somehow, NATO expansion, USA).  A year later, extensive news media coverage of the history of Putin’s naked imperial ambitions all over the former USSR, not to mention the war crimes and atrocities committed by his troops in Ukraine, leave many with little interest in that debate.

We have a new and more relevant to the moment set of questions to ponder on Monday. They are even harder ones than last time.  Ukrainians have amazed the world in the last year with their courage and military capability in the face of a brutal onslaught.  The once-feared Russian military occupies only about one-sixth of its neighbor, and that has cost Putin close to 150,000 casualties, his reputation as much more than a thug, and Russian civilians more and more, as multilateral sanctions bite harder at Russia’s economy more than most outsiders realize.  NATO is in deeper now, too, hence our topic wording.

And yet, both NATO and Russia have exercised restraint against each other.  NATO aid to Ukraine has come from individual member states, NOT from the alliance formally, although NATO leaders are openly coordinating who gives what.  Putin blusters and threatens to escalate against NATO and the USA.  Yet unless I am missing something big, he hasn’t done so yet.

The plain truth is that most wars eventually end in a negotiated settlement, albeit sometimes ones that are morally hard to swallow.  This meeting is to discuss whether/how this terrible war might come to an end in 2023, and what either peace or continued stalemate might mean for the world and the NATO alliance.  To do so intelligently, we will need to make some educated guesses about the future, such as

  1. The Fighting:  Can each side keep fighting at this pace for another year? Militarily versus politically.
  2. The Goals:  Will Russia/Ukraine keep holding out for total victory, or settle for something less?
  3. The Allies:  Will outside parties – NATO members, Iran, China, others – keep pouring in weapons and other assistance as long as their side asks for it?  AND will they pressure either side (okay – Ukraine) to negotiate and make concessions?
  4. The unknowns:  War is as unpredictable as it is cruel.  So are enemies.  Allies are fickle and have their own interests to protect.  Luck and accidents happen.  What kinds of things could go wrong or right in this tragedy that would affect the outcome?

Most news media coverage is too shallow to help us much, IMO.   Below are a few articles that shed some light on our questions.  Don’t look at me for expertise on this one.  Still, I will open our mtg with quick summaries of –

  1. What big factors open sources say might swing the war one way or the other in 2023, focusing on NATO’s role.
  2. Major peace proposals made so far (none of which show much promise yet).

OPTIONAL BACKGROUND READINGS –

NEXT WEEK (March 13):  The Surveillance Century, Part II – Governments.

Monday’s Mtg (12/12/22): Is arms control still relevant?

A big preoccupation in the second half of the 20th century was to prevent horribly destructive wars like those that occurred in the century’s first half.  Arms control was one of the tools used to do so.  Arms control consists of treaties or agreements between nations or groups of nations to limit the “research, development, production, fielding, or employment of certain weapons, features of weapons, applications of weapons, or weapons delivery systems.”

Arms control was tried in many areas.  Nuclear arms control used all those familiar acronyms like SALT and START (+ less familiar ones) to reduce deployed U.S. and Soviet launchers and warheads, destructive power, testing, and their spread to non-nuclear states.  CivCon member Fred worked to help monitor a major such treaty that banned a class of short-range nuclear weapons in Europe in the 1980s.  Treaties ban biological and most chemical weapons; and prohibit the sale of “dual-use” (civilian and military uses) technologies, notably missile technology, to all or sometimes certain countries.  Treaties limit land mine use and ban cluster bombs, and there is even an agreement to try to stanch the flow of small arms to conflict-ridden nations. 

Did and does arms control work?  That is Big Question #1 for us.  Some agreements probably have helped to keep the peace and reduce wars’ destruction.  Others failed.  Others it is hard to say.  Whether deterrence works and why are hard to measure – how do you prove why something didn’t happen?

Question #2 concerns the future of arms control.  The world is entering a dangerous new age that, IMO, will make us very vulnerable to great power wars.  Historically, multipolar periods full of rising and falling powers have led to arms races and wars first, arms control later.  The arms races (or rebalancing?) have started.  China plans to quintuple its nuclear arsenal by the 2030s, and no treaty prohibits it.  Both China and Russia are deploying hypersonic cruise missiles.  Many nations have their own drones, cyberwar capability, and AI.  Artificial Intelligence might soon play key roles in deciding when to start and how to wage wars.  Would you like to play a game?

Another obstacle, aside from nations jockeying for position, starts at home.  The last two Republican Presidents have pulled us out of four major arms control agreements, and the new and imporved GOP seems to oppose arms control in principle.  (Presidents Obama and Biden used it, notably getting a nuke agreement with Iran – before Trump pulled us out!  Yet Obama and Biden are spending trillions to modernize our nuclear forces.) 

So, is arms control still relevant, Y/N?  I fear it is 1950 or 1960 again; i.e., shortly before major crises broke out that led to brutal wars or almost killed, BUT also spurred the world to take controlling WMD seriously.  Could we maybe skip the terrifying crises first this time?  Or is arms control not practical anymore in a multipolar world with an aggressive Russia and China and so many early-stage military technologies?

I’ll open Monday’s mtg by listing major arms control agreements that are still in force, emphasizing a few key ones that either have worked very well or will soon expire.  Then, an analytical point or two, sinc­e I used to know a bit about this field.  Then…

FRED:  I will turn to you to ask about two ingredients for arms control: Mutual incentives and mutual trust.  What factors lead antagonists to try arms control, and what can overcome their mistrust that the other side will honor an agreement?

Note:  Good links are hard to come by here; either too narrow or technical/long.  Try the few recommended ones.

DISCUSSION QUESTIONS –

  1. What major arms control bilateral/multilateral treaties and agreements are in force right now? 
  2. Have they worked?   Did they do any harm?  Lessons learned?
  3. What has changed this century to make arms control either more or less urgent? 
  4. More/less difficult? 

OPTIONAL BACKGROUND READINGS –

Nuclear and other arms control –

New Technologies –

Related CivCon mtgs –

NEXT WEEK (12/19/22):  Deism – Is religion meaningful without a God that intervenes in the world?  [e.g., miracles, answers prayers, punishes the wicked.]

Monday’s Mtg (12/5/22): Inflation – Causes, consequences, and cures

This is the national problem that is on everyone’s lips these days.  In most polls before November 8, the public cited inflation as its #1 worry.  Arguably, the election ended in pretty much a tie because two things balanced.  Inflation concerns neutralized an otherwise strong economy, but it was offset by voters’ concerns over reproductive rights and Republican candidate (Party?) extremism.  Divided government – yet again – is the result.

Inflation is a hard topic, despite its importance.  The causes are complex and solutions are subject to a lot of uncertainty.  Uncertainty is inherent to economics, of course.  Like all social sciences, there is no way to conduct a counterfactual experiment to isolate key causes from noise, nor is there yet enough data on what’s been happening to do so.  Adding to these uncertainties are three more factors: (1) USA has not experienced high inflation since the 1970s; (2) theories and theorists disagree on inflation’s causes/cures; and (3) economics has grown highly ideological, especially as interpreted for us by experts and “experts” that the news media relies on.

I am neither an expert or “expert.” No PhD.  But I do have a significant edu/work background in economics.  I know enough to do a short introduction on Monday that will cover:

  1. Causes of inflation in general and the consensus on what has triggered this resurgence.  Short answer: 4-5 factors, but hard to quantify.
  2. Effects of this inflation worldwide.  Most are obvious, so I will only emphasize effects that are important but non-obvious.
  3. Solutions:  Above my pay grade.  So, I’ll just list main tools govts have for fighting inflation and the big tradeoffs and risks using them presents.  Much of what is happening is beyond govt’s control and must run its course, but the right policies can help. 

Inflation is hard, but it is not rocket science!  My goal for the meeting is for us to leave it with a clearer picture of why inflation worldwide has surged, who it is hurting the most, and the options/risks of acting and not acting.  Debunking some of the blizzard of lies about what is happening would be nice, too.

The articles below that are recommended give ABCs of inflation, should you want to go over them.  I also highlighted a few others that are a bit harder but go deeper.

OPTIONAL BACKGROUND READINGS – (6-7 total; only 3-4 urgent reads.)

Inflation and its causes –

How long will it last + Who is being hurt the most?

Solutions –

NEXT WEEK (12/12/22):  Is arms control still relevant?

Monday’s Mt (10/24/22): What makes a cold war turn hot?

By most definitions a cold war is an extended period of hostile relations between two countries or blocks of countries that seldom flares up into direct large-scale armed conflict.  Incidents of violence and coercion occur in cold wars, such as proxy wars, arms races, terrorism, espionage and sabotage, and propaganda wars. 

Obviously, preventing a direct war and quickly de-escalating violence when it starts are key.  The U.S.-Soviet Cold War (I’ll capitalize this one for convenience) turned hot regularly, like in Korea and Vietnam.  Most of the violence was confined to indirect, yet bloody, proxy wars.   Millions died and at least twice we almost stumbled into nuclear war.  On Monday we could talk about lessons learned from The Cold War about how to keep a cold war cold and/or how to prevent getting embroiled in them in the first place. 

Or, we could focus on how to manage the cold wars we are in right now.  I would say there are at least three: China, Russia, and (grudgingly on the list because it’s so much weaker a country) Iran.  Vladimir Putin has been very upfront about getting Russia’s empire back, even if it means invading one neighbor after another under the shield of its large nuclear arsenal.  That we are in a cold war with China is hard to deny anymore, in both, military, economic, and cultural spheres.  China’s strongman Xi just upped his threats to Taiwan this week.  Since great power competition may be the new master narrative of the 21st century, and frightening new weapons technologies are proliferating, we also ought to debate how to contain our ongoing cold wars.    

Lessons come from abroad, too.  India and Pakistan have been in a tense on again off again cold/hot war for 60 years. They fought four major shooting wars now each possesses nuclear weapons.  The Korea standoff is almost 70 years old.  Israel remains frozen in cold war with most of its neighbors, notably Iran.  Iran also is in cold war, complete with a brutal proxy war, with Saudi Arabia. The Wiki article linked to below lists other such conflicts from the past.  Oddly, it does not include early 20th-century Europe, which endured decades of cold war-like uneasy, shifting alliances and arms races before it all blew up in their faces in 1914.

So, Monday’s topic seems practically urgent, given Putin and Xi and the Middle East and past and present – but also one of those topics that could go in all directions at once if we do not limit it a bit.  Since it is not clear where the mtg will go, I’ve overwhelmed you with readings.  They focus on the chances of nuclear escalation in Ukraine, lessons learned from USSR Cold War, and how to apply those lessons to “cold war II” (China).

Me?  I think we should try to focus not on current events but rather on the literal topic question:  Based on history and common-sense, what kinds of events/accidents, internal political pressures, leadership mistakes, and miscommunications tend to trigger shooting wars between antagonistic powers that do not really want to go to war?  Ukraine and Taiwan are the most obvious places those lessons might need to be applied to.  But they will not be the last.

OPTIONAL BACKGROUND READINGS –

NEXT WEEK (10/31):  No mtg.

Monday’s Mtg (8/15/22): Will India become a major world power? Will it remain a democracy?

Monday, August 15th, the day we meet, is India’s 75th Independence Day!  On that date in 1947, 200 or so years of British rule ended, and India’s destiny became its own   Given the current U.S. Cold War with China and Putin’s war on the global economy via his bloody invasion of Ukraine – not to mention our many grave internal problems, it is perhaps understandable that India’s 75th birthday will pass little-noted in the United States.

But India matters.  And the power and influence of the world’s largest democracy is only going to grow as the century unfolds.  India’s regional influence will grow (a region that has Pakistan, Myanmar, and Chinese Tibet, all which India borders).  And its global role will expand as its sheer size and power will necessitate its cooperation in managing major global problems – Climate change, nuclear proliferation, and China’s expansion come to mind.  Already, as the articles below explain, other countries including the USA are trying to entice India into international agreements and forums that will forge closer ties and better cooperation in the future.  We will need them.

Yet, India has its own interests to prioritize, and its own internal problems, too.  DavidG knows a bit about India’s international situation and problems, but not much.  Worse, I know very little about the country’s society, economy, or internal politics.  Luckily it looks like we may have some people with real knowledge of India attending our meeting, so maybe they can help us.

The only thing I can say with any confidence is that outsiders are concerned about India’s internal cohesion and growing communal strife, especially between India’s 200 million Muslims and its national government, which has been led since 2014 by a Hindu nationalist-oriented political party known as the BJP.  India’s future as a minimally liberal democracy may be at risk – or failing.  The country also has caste divisions; urban rural divides; and other problems associated with developing countries, like gender discrimination, mass poverty, and a scarcity of good jobs for the next generation.  All of this is before the effects of climate change get worse. 

Try to read a few of the recommended articles.  Since I cannot distinguish one Indian newspaper from another, I did not link to any of them.  Sorry.  I will do a short intro on recent U.S. efforts to realign India more towards Western countries and away from the axis of authoritarian states that may be developing between China, Russia, some Middle Eastern states, and others. 

OPTIONAL BACKGROUND READINGS –

Basics on India

Politics of India –

India and the world –

NEXT WEEK (8/22):  How does the meaning of friendship change as we age?

Monday’s Mtg (8/1/22): What’s the future of global democracy? How much depends on the USA?

I feel like I’m writing this post from an alternative universe.  One where American democracy is intact, rather than on the verge of being snuffed out deliberately by one of its own major political parties.  We have talked about the pre- and post-Trump GOP’s plans to dismantle constitutional govt so many times, what’s the point of going over it again?  Still, the first couple of links go over the details, in case you haven’t looked up in the last decade and seen the Pompeii-sized ash cloud coming to choke U.S. democracy.

This meeting is about how democracy is faring around the world, however.  Despite many recent setbacks, the end is not as nigh as some are saying.  Most other countries use parliamentary systems of one kind or another, rather than the American-style presidential-based system.   As we have discussed, our constitutional system may be a part of the problem.  But parliamentary systems have not been exempt from autocratic backsliding, either.  The last ten years have been catastrophic for democracy in many countries.  Hungary.  Brazil.  Venezuela.  Poland.  Turkey.  Guatemala.  Burma.  Mozambique.  When one adds in China and Russia, less than one-half of the global population lives in a free society.    

We have played a big role in some of this – going both ways, of course.  We have promoted democracy and liberalism in some countries, some of the time, especially in Europe and Northeast Asia.  We used alliances, trade and investment, aid and technical democracy assistance (supporting a free press, setting up election systems, etc.).  Of course, we could have many meetings on how we have undermined democracy, overthrown elected govts, etc.  It’s been especially bad in Latin America and the Middle East, IMO.  Democracy promotion has never been this country’s top foreign priority, and probably never will be.

But – and here’s the point.  In a 21st century where authoritarianism is on the march globally, our efforts to do what we realistically can do to help democracy survive – here and abroad! – may grow to become more important than they have in a long timeEncouraging mutual support among global democracies is one of President Biden’s top FP goals (although events certainly have crowded out that agenda).

Monday’s mtg serves two purposes, to me.  To learn:

  1. How today’s authoritarian political movements – including our own GOP – are using new technologies and communications strategies to rot democracy from within. 
  2. What are the root causes that make people passively accept – or actively root for – the death of their own democracy and its liberal political culture. 

We can even discuss solutions, although admittedly, they seem scarce right now. 

Luckily for us all, history never ends.  The world is pushing back against Putin’s invasion of Ukraine and his general thuggery, and against Xi’s attempts to establish China’s hegemony over Asia.  Often autocrats are less insulated from public opinion than they think.  Try to read at least the one article that requires you to give up your email (it provides key background).  I will see you on Monday.

OPTIONAL BACKGROUND READINGS –

USA –

Globally –

CivCon mtgs –

NEXT WEEK (8/8):  Cancel culture: What does it mean and who’s doing it?